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Establishing a federal Cyprus
GREGORIS IOANNOU and GIORGOS CHARALAMBOUS 6 February 2017
What are the regional and domestic forces helping - and hindering - a
federal solution to the Cyprus issue?
A general view of Turkish controlled Cyprus from the roof of the former Ledra Palace Hotel
inside the United Nations Buffer Zone between the Greek and Turkish controlled areas of the
island. PAimages/Chris Ison. All rights reserved.
Following up from our previous article three months ago, we attempt to offer
some analytic explanations concerning the process of negotiating Cyprus and
to take a political position in it.
It is safe to say that the Cyprus peace process, with the aim of establishing a
type of federal state, is moving towards its conclusion in the next months. There
cannot be business as usual after this: either there will be an agreement or a
collapse of the negotiations, with a theoretical starting point some years later
and under probably different political circumstances and with different stakes
and aims.  
Still, there remains political and diplomatic play to unfold, of which the
importance is vividly illustrated in the absence of public predictions by the key
players as to the eventual result of the ongoing process. It is unclear whether a
high level convergence among major powers will materialize and shape the way
for a referendum. Even then, it is also unclear whether the public is likely to
accept - by a convenient majority - even the most mutually favourable plan.
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On imperialism and ‘mother lands’
It has become obvious recently that the broader relations between Turkey and
Greece - especially with respect to the demarcation of the Exclusive Economic
Zones between the two states - is a key parameter of the peace process in
Cyprus. The balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the eastern
Mediterranean in general and in Cyprus in particular has been a key factor of
the problem since the 1950s.
After the partition of Cyprus in 1974, a quasi equilibrium was reached with
Turkey having the upper hand in the military field and Greece in the diplomatic
field. As the Republic of Cyprus in Greek Cypriot hands was reinforced, it began
resembling a de facto second Greek state. In a similar manner, the Turkish
Cypriot Republic of Northern Cyprus (established in 1983), remains financially
and logistically dependent on the Turkish state.
It is evident that in the run up to the Geneva talks a few weeks ago, Greek-
Turkish relations have become more autonomous from broader bi-lateral
relations, regional institutions and global alliances. The negotiations
demonstrate so far pretty much an image of Greece vs Turkey, without a clear
position from the main powers involved (excepting the UN) toward pushing one
or the other towards a more compromising stance.
In the effort of both sides to maintain a tough line, they also make loud
statements aimed primarily for domestic consumption, but at the same time
impacting negatively on the peace process and the climate in which it occurs.
The quintessence of a hostile climate concerns the issue of trust by the people
who will be called upon to vote for the agreement; the perception of the
‘barbaric Turk’ by the Greek Cypriots and of the ‘arrogant and nationalist Greek’
by the Turkish Cypriots has become consolidated as embodying concrete
threats that may come to haunt them in a re-unified island.
In any case, the rivalry between Greece and Turkey is much bigger than
Cyprus, and it is in this frame that the opposing statements from leading
officials from the two governments need to be interpreted.
As the negotiations evolve it also becomes increasingly clear that in the north,
Turkey has an even bigger role to play than Greece in the south. In the Greek
Cypriot community, the newly emerging tough stance of Greece, is more an
extra boost to the local rejectionist forces and status quo interests, in that it can
delay and even derail the prospect of an agreement.
Withdrawal cannot be immediate and
cannot be total. This is not a stance
that can be legitimated in Turkey’s
political system; it is contrary to
Erdogan’s profile as a leader and to
Turkish Cypriot anxieties, desires
and expectations.
The Greek stance at the same time is subject to Greek Cypriot pro-reunification
pressures. And if an agreement is eventually reached, there are enough
resources amongst the Greek Cypriot rejectionist forces to fight against
reunification, even in defiance of a Greek government.
In the Turkish Cypriot community, the situation is different, and in some respects
opposite. The fragmentation of pro peace political forces and the decreasing
pro reunification mobilization potential, the enhanced and deeper cultural and
economic penetration of Turkey into north Cyprus since 2004 and the (largely
structural) weakness of the Turkish Cypriot leader to transcend the commands
of the Turkish government render Erdogan as effectively the key agent that can
prevent an agreement from happening now, but who can also push it through a
referendum if an agreement is made.
The reshaping of the geopolitical order after the collapse of the Soviet Union did
not alter the balance in Cyprus, despite the changes occurring as both the
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey began their path towards the EU. The
negotiations in the early 1990s failed and the strategy of tension that followed
2/12/2019 Establishing a federal Cyprus | openDemocracy
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/gregoris-ioannou-giorgos-charalambous/establishing-federal-cyprus 3/6
created political conditions that obstructed the negotiations from proceeding to
the final stage until the early 2000s, at the conjuncture when the Republic of
Cyprus was to enter the EU and Turkey to gain the status of an EU candidate
country. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots and the entry of
the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without its effective control of the northern
part of the island has made the EU an important voice in the Cyprus problem as
well.
This Greek Cypriot aim from the beginning becomes materialized only now, 13
years later in different circumstances and with EU and Turkey relations having
taken a different form. The EU seeks to extend its control to north Cyprus
through a solution of the Cyprus problem, ending not only an anomaly it has
inherited, but also strengthening its geopolitical influence in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its energy resources and routes.
Turkey seeks now to use Cyprus as a bargaining piece, not in order to pave its
way into the EU as was the case 14 years ago, but in order to achieve
recognition from the EU as a major power at its border with which the EU needs
to have a special relationship. This new more direct EU-Turkey parameter in the
Cyprus negotiation is not necessarily working in favor of reunification: it
substantially enlarges the stakes and the issues under negotiation and may
make an agreement more elusive at the present stage, and of a different sort in
the medium term even by-passing the Greek Cypriot government of the
Republic of Cyprus, if the current process collapses.
Although Turkey’s final cards have not been played on account of domestic
instability and a foreign policy with many open fronts, its desire to exchange its
withdrawal from Cyprus with an understanding with the EU and Greece is
clearly visible, primarily but not exclusively through the attitude of the Turkish
Cypriot leadership.
But that withdrawal cannot be immediate and cannot be total. This is not a
stance that can be legitimated in Turkey’s political system; it is contrary to
Erdogan’s profile as a leader and to Turkish Cypriot anxieties, desires and
expectations. The treaty of guarantees will have to be revised, but it cannot just
evaporate into thin air – nor can half a century of political and military presence
in the island. 
The Turkish position on Cyprus goes far beyond the intransigence of the
Erdogan regime and into the diachronic security concerns among the Turkish
Cypriots as well as Turkey’s geopolitical status in the Eastern Mediterranean. In
this vein, a transitional period with a small and symbolic Turkish military
presence and some role by Turkey in the security system currently being
discussed is inevitable. Any absolute refusal as to this and more specifically the
demands for an immediate and absolute withdrawal of Turkish troops, even
before the enforcement of the agreement and the total exclusion of Turkey from
the security system are simply out of touch with reality. And this without any
serious prospects to maintain the current state of affairs in the political and
economic fronts; that is, the continuing monopolization of the Republic in Greek
Cypriot hands.
There are significant issues that have not yet been agreed but the balance is
more or less known and this will not lead to any one of the two sides retreating
fully. Both will have to retreat so that they find themselves somewhere in the
middle – rotating presidency with cross voting, the town of Morphou under
Greek Cypriot administration but with rights of remain to the current population,
total withdrawal of the Turkish army but at a gradual pace, abolition of Turkey’s
right to unilateral intervention but maintaining Turkey in Cyprus’ security system.
The UN refrains from pressurizing the two sides but it is clear that at some point
it will have to call an end game in the current process. And in case of a collapse
of the negotiations, it will most probably orient itself to an even more reduced
role in the next period. The resumption of the talks at high level may have been
postponed for April after the referendum in Turkey about the constitutional
reform, but it is doubtful whether any substantial change will occur then.
One may dismiss the Greek and Turkish governments’ nationalistic cries, yet
there are material issues and real state interests besides the public opinion in
the two countries. Although a compromise agreement between Greece and
Turkey on Cyprus is very possible, it may not happen as both states see Cyprus
as one piece in their broader interests and relations. In order to agree they must
also reach a sort of understanding concerning the framework through which
2/12/2019 Establishing a federal Cyprus | openDemocracy
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/gregoris-ioannou-giorgos-charalambous/establishing-federal-cyprus 4/6
they would continue to compete and resolve the rest of their matters and
specifically the demarcation of their exclusive economic zones.
On the bigger plane, an agreement on the Cyprus problem can only be based
on the acceptance by the US and the UK that Russia cannot be ignored in the
Eastern Mediterranean. There are signs that this is feasible as Russia’s
endurance in the global plane and more specifically in the Middle East, has
made it clear that an agreement in Cyprus can only take place if Russia
supports, or at least tolerates it. This would be reflected in the role of the
Security Council, the transitional periods and the security system to be
instituted.
A border crossing on Ledra Street, which separates the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
parts of Nicosia. PAimages/Jens Kalaene. All rights reserved.
Politics on the ground: the two intra-communal camps
The main development in the last three months is the further strengthening of
the two camps in favour and against the reunification process. In parallel, the
cleavage separating them at both the social and political levels has been
reinforced in discursive, organizational as well as political terms.
Fascist and other right wing street protests against the peace process and the
prospect of a federal solution are becoming a standard. Protests come along
with a series of other public events, such as panel discussions, petitions, open
letters etc, by the “five centre parties”, ELAM and Church leaders as well as
other nationalist and far-right wing groups, intellectuals and opinion leaders.
In Cyprus, violence is not seen as an
immediate concern, but rather a
divisive mark from the past.
The clearest statements in favor of a solution and most willing to support the
process from the trade unionists and from the peace activists, as does pro-
solution mobilisation. Business representatives are more divided with
statements both for and against. The fact that the two main parties AKEL and
DISY, fully support Anastasiades’ negotiation effort at this conjuncture is highly
significant. Since the mid-1980s when they united against then President’s
Spyros Kyprianou’s intransigence in the negotiations, each of the two parties
(and especially AKEL) has been very careful to draw clear boundaries from the
other’s position on the Cyprus problem.
Yet, in line of successive developments, with Anastasiades building on and
carrying forward joint decisions made by Christofias without changing much, the
political gap between AKEL and DISY on this issue has shrunk. To be sure,
both sides retreated on previous stances throughout time. DISY has
backtracked on its position in favor of NATO’s involvement in the process and of
a “loose” federation, while AKEL has retreated from an overt emphasis on
procedural matters and has refused to succumb to rejectionist internal and
external pressures.  
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Partly because this division between AKEL and DISY is not simply a political
matter, the two parties’ ideological incompatibility is likely to play a role in
determining internal opposition. Specifically AKEL and DISY dissenters are both
openly and covertly intervening against the negotiations and against the
prospect of an agreement in the current circumstances. These include both high
profile personalities, who tend to be more careful, but also lower rank and local
cadres.
Left-wing rejectionists evoke various things such as patriotism, internationalism,
anti-imperialism, nationalism and even anti-capitalism. The argument of the
most coherent rejectionist line inside AKEL itself more or less argues that too
much is being conceded to foreign imperialism, of which Turkish expansionism
is a manifestation. Inside DISY, opposition is essentially more traditionally
nationalist, not in civic terms but on more ethnocentric lines.
In the Turkish Cypriot community there is both continuity and change with
respect to the political system and the various pro and anti reunification forces.
The traditional right currently governing remains staunchly oppositional and
undermines Mustafa Akinci’s efforts while occasionally clashing frontally with
him using nationalist arguments and rhetoric. Old and new fascist and far right
groups have also made their customary appearance, threatening the “traitors”
and including in them not only trade unionists and leftists but also Akinci
himself.
The traditional left, although weaker and more fragmented today, firmly
supports the reunification process, albeit without a mass movement shaping the
political climate this time. The pro EU business groups and many civil society
organizations and NGOs are also in favor of reunification and so is that
segment of Turkish Cypriot society that feels alarmed with the developments in
Turkey and the drift towards authoritarianism there.
However, what seems to be holding the balance is the new centre-right party
led by Kudret Özersay, who maintains close links with Turkey and who is
ambivalent with respect to the reunification process. Although Özersay as a
technocrat had supported reunification, as a politician today with polls showing
his People’s Party as the most popular one in the north, he seems more
interested in establishing himself in a pivot position in the political system.
Unlike the left which sees the future of the Turkish Cypriot community as
passing through a federal Cyprus and unlike the right which sees value in the
status quo, Özersay attempts to express a third position that prioritizes
modernizing reform and Turkish Cypriot autonomy and refusing, for the
moment, the dilemma of partition or federation.
Projections towards a pending definitive conclusion
The immediate purpose of agreements for ethno-nationalist conflict within
countries is usually to freeze the military or paramilitary confrontations, and
prevent violence from re-occurring. Both the Good Friday Agreement for Ireland
and the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, can be seen
as ‘constructions of necessity’.
This is not the case in Cyprus where violence is not (and is not seen as
potentially) an immediate concern, but rather a divisive mark from the past,
which is becoming all the more distant in the minds of the local populations and
is further diluted by the increasingly multi-cultural demographic composition of
the island.
This very fact makes an eventual agreement very uncertain in form and nature.
Both actually resolving the conflict and freezing it through de facto or formal
partition are still possible options for all the players involved as the need for a
solution may not be seen as urgent either in the domestic or international
sphere. Yet, for progressive Cypriots, north and south, reunification is a matter
of urgency as well as necessity, in terms of both substance and in terms of the
potential to be unleashed in the process.
If there is an agreement, a very polarized political conflict will unfold both north
and south. But more so in the south where the outcome will be more uncertain
and probably close. In the north since the agreement, if there is one, will have
to be inevitably endorsed by the Turkish government, the nationalist rejectionist
forces will be in a disadvantageous position.
In the Greek Cypriot community, the Greek government does not have this sort
of leverage and will not be able to control the rejectionist forces. If there is no
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agreement, we expect changes to take place in the short and medium term. A
deadlock will most probably be announced, a more blunt report should be
expected from the UN and any future discussions will only take place after the
passage of a couple years.
By then, the agency of different players could shape developments in different
ways, most probably towards more partitionist directions.
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